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The most prevalent and intense emotional experiences differ across cultures. These
differences in emotional experience can be understood as the outcomes of emotion
regulation, because emotions that fit the valued relationships within a culture tend to
be most common and intense. We review evidence suggesting that emotion regulation
underlying cultural differences in emotional experience often takes place at the point of
emotion elicitation through the promotion of situations and appraisals that are consistent
with culturally valued relationships. These regulatory processes depend on individual
tendencies, but are also co-regulated within relationships—close others shape people’s
environment and help them appraise events in culturally valued ways—and are afforded by
structural conditions—people’s daily lives “limit” the opportunities for emotion, and afford
certain appraisals. The combined evidence suggests that cultural differences in emotion
regulation go well beyond the effortful regulation based on display rules.
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In her ethnography Never in Anger, the anthropologist Jean
Briggs describes her time with the Utku Inuit (Briggs, 1970).
Adult Utku Inuit rarely express anger: The observation that
gave the book its name is not hard to understand when you
consider how important it is for a group without technolog-
ical infrastructure to stick together in a cold and unforgiving
climate. The group’s closeness and harmony and, therefore,
the avoidance of anger, was a central cultural goal for the
Utku Inuit. Although Briggs describes a few instances of
suppression and displacement of angry behavior—hitting the
dogs is one such instance—most of the cultural regulation
among the Inuit seemed to be focused on avoiding the occur-
rence of anger. Anger was rare, because there were few anger
antecedents, and because few situations were interpreted as
such: Utku Inuit avoided frustrating each other, and in addi-
tion, they were very slow to interpret someone else’s behavior as
frustrating.
The example illustrates the phenomenon of cultural regula-
tion, which we understand as the combined cultural processes that
result in the alignment of emotions with cultural values, ideals,
goals and concerns. Particularly, we will argue (1) that emotional
experiences tend to be congruent with culturally central values,
ideals, goals, and concerns, (2) that regulation towards culturally
congruent emotions often takes place at the point of emotion elic-
itation, and (3) that regulation happens at the levels of individual
tendencies, relational co-regulation and structural affordances.
We will support these arguments by discussing cross-cultural
evidence.
PATTERNS OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES ARE CONGRUENT
WITH CULTURALLY VALUED RELATIONSHIPS
EMOTIONS, EMOTION REGULATION, AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
Emotions are central to social relationships (e.g., Jankowiak and
Fischer, 1992; Frijda andMesquita, 1994; Keltner andHaidt, 1999;
Oatley et al., 2006; Mesquita, 2010). By having and expressing
an emotion, we take a stance in the social world, express our
concerns, and reveal our strategies, goals, and intentions to act
(Frijda, 1986, 2007; Solomon, 2004; Griffiths and Scarantino,
2009). For instance, when Mary feels guilty, she holds herself
responsible for John’s unhappiness, she implies that John’s well-
being is important to her, and she is resolved to make up for
what she did wrong. In contrast, when Mary is angry at John, she
holds him responsible for something bad, she implies that he vio-
lated her individual rights or her personal autonomy, and she is
intent on confronting him or taking revenge. Having a particular
emotion is thus tantamount to engaging in a relationship in a par-
ticular way. When Mary feels guilty, her relationship with John is
very different from when she feels angry.
To successfully manage our relationships with others, we
need to have and express certain emotions. Emotion regulation
refers to all the processes that help to attain culturally appro-
priate (or functional)1 emotional experiences; appropriate are
1The idea that emotion regulation is functional, does not imply that reg-
ulation outcomes are adaptive in every situation. Rather, regulation shapes
emotions in ways that are usually more effective within a given socio-cultural
context than they would have been without regulation.
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those experiences that, within a culture, are more often than
not instrumental in the successful navigation of the social world.
What these experiences are may differ across cultures; yet, univer-
sally, emotion regulation appears to be motivated by a person’s
need to establish and maintain proper and good relationships
(Thompson, 1991; Gross et al., 2006).
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN VALUED RELATIONSHIPS
To have proper and good relationships with others means some-
thing different in different cultures (e.g., D’Andrade, 1984;
Holland and Quinn, 1987; Bruner, 1990; Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Shweder and Haidt, 2000). Given these differences in
the valued relationships, we can assume that the emotions that
are “helpful” or functional in coordinating people’s relation-
ships may differ accordingly. The relationship ideals between
European and East Asian cultural contexts may serve as an
example.
In European American contexts, a “good relationship” is
one in which each partner remains autonomous and partners
mutually strengthen each other’s individuality and indepen-
dence (Triandis, 1995; Kim and Markus, 1999; Rothbaum et al.,
2000). Individuality is, among others, strengthened by focusing
on the positive characteristics that show each partner’s unique-
ness and that enable them to be self-reliant; hence there is an
emphasis on high self-esteem (Hochschild, 1995; Heine et al.,
1999). It is important for this kind of relationship that part-
ners are able to take a stance or assert their desires; (construc-
tive) conflict is not eschewed but rather considered a necessary
bump in the road to strong relational ties (Canary et al., 1995).
Emotions such as pride and anger appear to be functional in
European American relationships since they reflect individual
self-worth and personal autonomy; shame and guilt, on the
other hand, are less valued since they may threaten a positive
self-view.
In contrast, “good relationships” in most East Asian cultural
contexts are those in which partners are interdependent and inter-
connected and adjust to each other’s expectations (Lebra, 1992;
Heine et al., 1999; Kim and Markus, 1999; Oishi and Diener,
2003). In order to meet these relational expectations, individuals
need to be aware of and improve on their shortcomings; hence the
focus is on negative information about oneself (Kitayama et al.,
1997). In East Asian interdependent cultural contexts, emotions
such as shame and guilt appear to be conducive to building strong
relationships because they highlight flaws and shortcomings and
thus promote alignment with social rules and relational embed-
dedness. In contrast, anger appears to be highly undesirable in
interdependent relationships because it may threaten relational
harmony; in that sense, East Asian contexts may be similar to the
Inuit context described before.
CULTURALLY DIFFERENT PATTERN OF EMOTIONS
In each culture, the “endpoints” of emotion regulation are dic-
tated by the culturally valued relationship models. In the example
of the Inuit described in Never in Anger, anger avoidance was
implicated by the ideal of social harmony. If we assume that peo-
ple are reasonably successful regulators of emotion, this should
result in cross-culturally different emotional experiences: Anger
was rarely expressed (and rarely felt) by the Inuit. The low rate
of anger feelings occurred notwithstanding the evidence that
the Inuit had the potential for anger: They got angry at their
dogs at times, and they also ended up being very angry at the
ethnographer herself after she had violated the principles of
harmony. This reflects a general pattern in ethnological and cross-
cultural research: While there are impressive similarities in the
potential for emotions, the actual cultural patterns of emotional
experience, and thus the endpoints of emotion regulation, dif-
fer cross-culturally in meaningful ways (Mesquita et al., 1997).
These differences in the actual cultural patterns can be under-
stood from the cultural relationship ideals (e.g., Kitayama et al.,
2006; Mesquita and Leu, 2007).
For instance, Kitayama and colleagues investigated the fre-
quency and intensity of different types of emotions in US and
Japanese students, using a retrospective self-report study and
a diary study (Kitayama and Markus, 2000; Kitayama et al.,
2006). Socially disengaging emotions—such as pride, anger, or
irritation—were found to be more frequent and intense in
European American than in Japanese cultural contexts; this is
consistent with the European American emphasis on autonomy
and independence. In contrast, socially engaging emotions—such
as close feelings, shame, guilt, or indebtedness—were found to
be more frequent and intense in Japanese than in European
American cultural contexts; this is in line with the East Asian
emphasis on relatedness and interdependence.
That cultures dictate the endpoints of emotion regulation is
also suggested by recent studies on emotional acculturation (De
Leersnyder et al., 2011). In these studies, we found that immi-
grants converge to the endpoints of regulation dictated by their
host culture. Korean immigrants to the US, and Turkish immi-
grants to Belgium shared their host cultures’ emotional patterns
to the degree they had spent time in the new country; immigrants
who reported more daily interactions with members of the host
culture—European Americans and native Belgians respectively—
reported patterns of emotional experience that were more similar
to those reported by members of the host cultures. Immigrants’
emotional patterns seem to change due to exposure to new rela-
tionship ideals, and to the endpoints of emotion regulation that
fit these ideals.
Several studies also suggested that attaining the culturally
defined endpoints of emotion regulation is rewarding. In the
diary study mentioned above (Kitayama et al., 2006), European
American and Japanese students reported more positive adjust-
ment when their emotions were closest to the cultural ideal.
Specifically, European Americans experiencing disengaging emo-
tions (pride, anger), and Japanese experiencing engaging emo-
tions (friendly, shame) reported the highest wellbeing. In a related
study (De Leersnyder et al., in preparation), Belgian students
reported on one of four types of situations, defined by valence
(positive, negative) and engagement (engaged, disengaged). The
students then rated their emotions at the time of the situation
on 30 different items. These ratings resulted, for each individ-
ual, in a pattern of emotional intensity. Per situation type, we
also calculated the average Belgian pattern of emotions. We found
support for the idea that the cultural “endpoints” of emotion reg-
ulation are socially rewarding: The correlation between a person’s
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patterns and the cultural average of emotional experience was
associated with that person’s self-reported well-being, as indicated
by fewer depressive symptoms and more satisfaction with their
social relationships.
In sum, it may be inferred that the culturally valued relation-
ship models dictate the endpoints of emotion regulation, and that
attaining these endpoints is rewarding. In the remainder of this
review, we discuss two types of antecedent-focused emotion reg-
ulation through which this may be achieved: situation selection
and appraisal.
ANTECEDENT-FOCUSED EMOTION REGULATION AS A
SOURCE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
ANTECEDENT-FOCUSED EMOTION REGULATION: SITUATION
SELECTION AND APPRAISAL
Emotion regulation has always been considered an important
source of cross-cultural differences in emotions (e.g., Ekman,
1992). Traditionally, emotion regulation was conceived as a con-
scious effort to suppress or change emotions due to the salience of
cultural display rules. For example, in one experiment, Japanese
students as compared to European Americans showed fewer neg-
ative emotions in response to a disturbing movie when another
person was present, but this was not the case when they watched
the movie by themselves. Japanese display rules were thought
to underlie this difference in the expression of negative emo-
tions (Ekman and Friesen, 1969). Cross-cultural evidence of a
much later date provides general support for the notion that
collectivist cultures, such as Japan, have display rules of suppres-
sion, at least for certain emotions (Matsumoto et al., 2008). Yet,
there is no evidence that cultural differences in suppression of
emotional responses in fact underlie the culturally different emo-
tional outcomes; it is equally questionable if suppression is the
only or even the strongest force in shaping cultural differences in
emotions.
In the current article we review evidence for the idea that
emotion regulation often occurs during the process of emo-
tion elicitation. Our review is organized around two constituent
processes of emotion regulation, namely situation selection and
appraisal, that both affect whether an emotion is elicited, and
what the nature of the emotion is. “Situation selection” has been
described as “approaching or avoiding certain people, places, or
objects in order to regulate emotions” (Gross, 1998, p. 283);
appraisal involves taking an evaluative stance (Solomon, 2004).
In this review, we provide evidence that both types of emotion
regulation produce cultural differences in emotional experience.
We focus on appraisal generally as a site of emotion regulation,
rather than limiting the discussion to re-appraisal specifically, as
most of the emotion regulation literature does (e.g., Gross, 1998,
2007). The first reason is that, with few exceptions, appraisal
and re-appraisal are hard to distinguish both conceptually and
empirically (Campos et al., 2004; Mesquita and Albert, 2007;
Mesquita and Frijda, 2011), because these processes often occur
automatically (Mauss et al., 2008). The second reason is that
culture-level regulationmay affect the initial appraisal rather than
re-appraisal; culture renders certain appraisals more salient than
others, thereby “regulating” the emotions that people are likely to
experience in their culture.
DIFFERENT SOURCES OF EMOTION REGULATION
The literature on emotion regulation has primarily focused on
individual-level emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; Gross et al.,
2011)—e.g., Mary is angry at John, but she tries to reinterpret
his rude behavior by telling herself that he has been under a lot of
pressure, or may just have been oblivious to the consequences of
his behavior. (Re-)Appraisal at this level may be subject to cultural
influence when culturally prevalent ideals about how to relate
to (certain) others affect the ways in which individuals appraise
situations. For instance, the cultural ideal that a woman should
support her husband may make Mary more likely to attribute
John’s behavior to external pressures—both in terms of her ini-
tial appraisal or her later re-appraisal of John’s behavior. This is
an example of culturally influenced individual-level regulation.
We distinguish two other sources of regulation. First, there is
some evidence for relational co-regulation by close others, most
notably the work on parents’ regulation of children’s emotions—
e.g., a caregiver telling the child that her brother did not break
the toy on purpose, and that she should get over her anger
(e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1999; Campos et al., 2004; Holodynski and
Friedlmeier, 2006). Furthermore, we distinguish a third source of
emotion regulation, which is of a structural nature: The organiza-
tion of everyday life affords certain types of emotional situations,
and suppresses others. Our review of cultural differences in emo-
tion regulation includes all three sources (individual, relational
and structural) for the two types of antecedent-focused emo-
tion regulation (situation selection and appraisal).Figure 1 shows
how cultural ideals provide a background against which individ-
ual tendencies, relational co-regulation and structural affordances
bring about certain emotional experiences through these two
types of regulation.
SITUATION SELECTION
Mary may avoid seeing John when he is stressed, because she
knows his rude behavior would make her angry. This is what has
been referred to as situation selection: approaching or avoiding
certain people, places, or objects in order to regulate emotions. At
a relational level, situation selection may take place when people
structure each other’s experiences by encouraging one another to
avoid or seek out certain situations. For example, in an attempt
to avoid anger, the Utku Inuit structured their interactions in
ways to avoid confrontations at all costs. The structural organi-
zation of everyday life may fulfill a similar role: politeness rules in
some societies reduce the likelihood of experiencing anger elicit-
ing encounters (Cohen, 1999). Situation selection may thus take
place at the individual, the relational, and the structural level;
culture may play a role at all levels.
Individual tendencies
People’s selection of situations and according emotional expe-
rience is, for example, shaped by their motivational focus. A
promotion focus leads to happiness in the case of success, and to
depression in the case of failure, whereas a prevention focus leads
to relief in the case of success, and anxiety in the case of failure
(Higgins et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2000). Research on motivational
focus suggests that people from cultures that value autonomy
and individuality as relationship goals (e.g. US contexts) are
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FIGURE 1 | Three sources of antecedent-focused emotion regulation in cultural context.
more focused on the accomplishment of positive outcomes (i.e.,
promotion focus), whereas people in cultures emphasizing rela-
tional harmony and obligation (e.g. East Asian, Russian) are
more concerned with avoiding negative outcomes (i.e., prevention
focus; Lee et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2001). American respon-
dents thus seek out situations that promise success, whereas East
Asians and Russians avoid situations that are likely to lead to
failure (for instance, the failure to meet social expectations).
A cross-cultural vignette study on success and failure in European
American and Chinese cultural contexts confirmed that these cul-
tural differences in individual-level situation selection give rise to
differences in emotional experience (Lee et al., 2000). Consistent
with their cultural focus on promotion, European Americans
reported a higher intensity of happiness/depressed emotions than
relief/anxiety. Conversely, consistent with their cultural focus on
prevention, the Chinese group reported a higher intensity of
relief/anxiety than happiness/depressed emotions. This is some
first evidence that the differences in situation selection at the
level of approach or avoidance are related to differences in the
prevalent types of emotions.
People also tend to seek out situations that elicit culturally
“ideal” affect (Tsai, 2007). What is considered ideal affect dif-
fers between cultures: European Americans prefer high activation
positive emotions (e.g., excitement), because these emotions fore-
ground individual experience and prepare people for asserting
themselves and influencing others (Tsai et al., 2007). In contrast,
East Asians value low arousal positive states (e.g., calm, relaxed),
because these emotional states facilitate attention to the context
(Bradley et al., 2001 as cited in Tsai, 2007) and prepare people
for adjusting their behavior to others’ needs (Tsai et al., 2007).
Consistently, survey research has documented cultural differences
in the activities that people in the respective cultural contexts seek
out: While North Americans seek out active individual activities
(e.g., running or rollerblading), up-beat music, and stimulants
(e.g., amphetamines, cocaine), East Asians are drawn to pas-
sive collective activities (e.g., sightseeing, picnicking), calmer
music, and sedatives (e.g., opiates) (Gobster and Delgado, 1992;
Tsai, 2007). By selecting certain situations over others, individ-
uals achieve those emotional states that are functional in their
respective cultural context.
Relational co-regulation
In many ways, situation selection takes place in the context our
relationships with others; hence, interactions with others shape
our emotional experience (Boiger andMesquita, 2012). Although
people structure each other’s emotional lives throughout the
lifespan (Mesquita, 2010), this phenomenon is especially appar-
ent in the first years of life. Parents organize their children’s
lives almost entirely; moreover, parental efforts appear to be in
the direction of promoting situations that elicit culturally val-
ued experiences (e.g., Goodnow, 1997; Güngör et al., 2011). By
shaping children’s environments, parents allow for and highlight
certain (emotional) experiences over others; they can thus be said
to co-regulate the child’s emotional life through situation selec-
tion. Across cultures, parents appear to select different situations
for their children. In each case, parents’ situation selection can
be understood as an attempt to align their children’s emotional
experiences to the culturally desired endpoints of emotion reg-
ulation, thus helping their children to successfully navigate their
social relationships.
Co-regulation occurs, for instance, when parents highlight or
re-activate certain emotional experiences as a learning opportu-
nity for their children. Across different cultures, parents appear
to highlight the types of emotional experiences that are central
to the culture’s relationship ideals (Whiting and Whiting, 1975;
Röttger-Rössler et al., in press). For instance, Taiwanese parents
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believe it is necessary and effective to highlight shame when their
pre-school children transgress social rules (Wang, 1992; Fung,
1999; Fung and Chen, 2002 as cited in Fung, 1999). Consistently,
Fung (1999) observed that Taiwanese parents of 2.5 year olds
engaged their child approximately three times an hour in dis-
cussions about shame episodes; the majority of which were still
ongoing. Most of these discussions were playful, and served as a
tool to teach children right from wrong, rather than to denigrate
them. Whenever Taiwanese children were about to transgress a
social norm, their parents constructed a discussion in such a
way that they would experience shame—an emotional experi-
ence that would teach the children how to behave properly. The
highlighting of shame is not universal. Observational studies with
European American parents in the tough and dangerous lower
class neighborhoods of Baltimore provide a sharp contrast to
the Taiwanese example (Miller et al., 1996, 1997). The Baltimore
parents actively avoided to turn their children’s wrongdoings in
shameful situations by rarely acknowledging their children’s rule
violations. In the rare cases when parents did talk about these
transgressions, they did not treat them as serious wrongdoings
in order to “toughen” their children.
Another way in which parents promote relevant emotional sit-
uations is by engaging their children in memory conversations.
Parents frequently use these conversations to reminisce about
recent emotional events (Ross and Wang, 2010). Reminiscing
about these situations may in itself again give rise to culturally
valued emotional experiences. In one study, European American
and Chinese mothers were asked to discuss recent emotional
events with their children (Wang, 2001). European American and
Chinese mothers not only differed in the events they chose to dis-
cuss, but also in the way they discussed them. While European
American mothers focused on personal and non-social events,
Chinese mothers discussed events in which other people were
involved. The European American mothers engaged in a highly
elaborative style, stressing the child’s own role in the emotional
event. In doing so, they constructed conversational situations
in which the child’s own emotions and view on the situation
were paramount. These situations have likely afforded the expe-
rience of disengaging emotions such as pride or anger—at the
time of the conversation as well as for future events. In con-
trast, Chinese mothers were much less likely to elaborate on the
child’s experience of the event in detail. Instead, they focused on
the perspective of others who were involved, as well as on the
appropriate social behavior that would have been expected from
their children. In doing so, the Chinese mothers conveyed the
interdependent nature of emotions, thereby underlining the role
of their children’s emotions in social interactions and teaching
them important lessons about social conventions. Moreover, they
encouraged their children to experience emotions that are socially
engaging such as respect or shame, both during the conversation
as well as for the future.
Relatedly, differences in maternal sensitivity influence how
and when mothers intervene in structuring their children’s envi-
ronment, and consequently their emotions. While mothers who
display “reactive sensitivity” allow negative situations to happen
and restrict their interventions to cases where the child experi-
ences a full-blown emotion, “proactive” mothers monitor their
child’s surroundings and intervene before a negative emotional
situation has had the chance to develop (cf. Trommsdorff and
Rothbaum, 2008). The extent to which mothers use proactive
versus reactive strategies differs between cultures; for example,
German mothers were found to use more reactive strategies than
Japanese mothers; the latter focus more on proactive strategies
(Trommsdorff and Friedlmeier, 2010). In this study, differences
in maternal sensitivity caused the children to have different emo-
tional experiences: The proactive Japanese mothers protected
their children from negative experiences by removing or distract-
ing them; in contrast, the reactive Germanmothers exposed their
children to negative experiences. These differences in maternal
situation selection are consistent with the culture’s view on neg-
ative emotions. In a German context, where children need to
learn to assert themselves, experiencing and expressing negative
emotions may be more acceptable and functional than it is in a
Japanese context, where the expression of disengaging negative
emotions is seen as a threat to close relationships.
Structural conditions
The structure of everyday life can be seen as the selection of situa-
tions that habitually happen; this selection renders the experience
of certain emotions more or less likely. Everyday life differs across
cultures, and prevalent emotional experiences differ accordingly.
For example, European American social life is characterized by
practices that make individuals feel special and unique; these
practices afford happiness and feeling good about one’s (inde-
pendent) self (D’Andrade, 1984; Nisbett, 2003). In comparison,
many of the Japanese cultural practices promote shame; this
is consistent with the Japanese cultural model that emphasizes
self-criticism in order to live up to the expectations of others
(Heine et al., 1999). For example, at the end of each day, Japanese
school children are encouraged to engage in critical self-reflection
(“hansei”). This practice highlights shortcomings or weaknesses
and encourages improvement (Lewis, 1995), thereby affording
emotions such as shame.
These ethnographic observations were confirmed by a cross-
cultural study in which European Americans and Japanese were
asked to report on their interactions (Kitayama et al., 1997). A dif-
ferent group of European American and Japanese rated these
interactions with regard to the self-esteem they would afford.
The authors found that the European Americans had reported
situations that afforded self-enhancement (in both European
Americans and Japanese of the second group), which may have
promoted high-activation happiness and pride. On the other
hand, the Japanese situations afforded more self-criticism, which
may have promoted calmer emotional states, wariness and shame.
Everyday Japanese life may thus offer more opportunity to feel
ashamed, whereas European American daily life may offer the
opportunity to feel pride.
People’s emotions appear to hinge indeed on the situations
that have been “selected” to occur frequently (Boiger et al.,
in press, Study 1). In this study, we started from the idea that
situations that elicit culturally desirable or condoned emotions
should be promoted—and thus occur frequently, while situations
that elicit culturally undesirable or condemned emotions should
be avoided—and thus occur rarely. In line with the dominant
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cultural ideals in the US and Japan, we predicted that anger is
condoned in the US and condemned in Japan because it high-
lights personal desires and threatens relational harmony; shame
is condemned in the US and condoned in Japan because it high-
lights personal flaws and emphasizes social conventions. North
American and Japanese participants indicated for a number of
situations from both cultures how frequently most students they
know would encounter these situations and to what extent they
would feel the associated emotion (i.e., either anger or shame). In
line with our predictions, American students perceived situations
as more likely to occur to the extent that they elicited stronger
feelings of anger. In contrast, Japanese students, perceived situa-
tions as less likely to occur when they were highly angering. The
opposite picture emerged for shame: Japanese students rated the
situations that elicit stronger feelings of shame to be more likely
to occur than American students, who perceived them as rather
uncommon. Structural situation selection may account, at least
partially, for the finding from previous research (Kitayama and
Markus, 2000; Kitayama et al., 2006) that disengaging emotions
(e.g., anger) are more salient in Americans’ emotional lives while
engaging emotions (e.g., shame) prevail in Japanese emotional
lives.
We have recently replicated these findings with samples of
Japanese and Turkish students (Boiger et al., in preparation).
Again, participants from both cultures rated, for most students
they know, the frequency of anger and shame situations that had
previously been sampled in Japan and Turkey. As before, we found
that anger-eliciting situations were perceived to occur rarely in
Japan, while shame-eliciting situations were perceived to occur
frequently; this is in line with the Japanese goals of harmony
maintenance and self-improvement. In Turkey, both anger and
shame situations were perceived to occur frequently. This con-
current “up-regulation” of anger and shame situations may be
typical for an honor-based interdependent cultural context, such
as Turkey. In honor cultures, “honor must be claimed, and honor
must be paid by others. A person who claims honor but is not
paid honor does not in fact have honor” (Leung and Cohen,
2011, p. 509). The need to take a stand and uphold a reputation
of toughness, while at the same time having to rely upon others
to confirm one’s reputation may explain the concurrent promo-
tion of anger (as an emotion that helps in claiming honor) and
shame (as an emotion that helps in preventing the withdrawal
of honor through others) in Turkey. In comparison, in face-
cultures, such as Japan, face cannot be claimed but is obtained
by social conferral only; this explains why shame-promoting, but
not anger-promoting situations were perceived as frequent in
Japan.
APPRAISAL
Mary may take John’s rude behavior as a sign of his stress
instead of blaming him for being offensive. This would be an
example of emotion regulation through appraisal—in this case,
down-regulation of anger. We review evidence that there are cul-
tural differences in the prevalent types of appraisal that can be
understood from the culturally valued relationships. Thus, when
the Utku Inuit have a low tendency to blame, and this fact can
be understood from their concern for avoiding confrontations,
we assume that some kind of regulation is at play. At the level
of the individual, it is often hard to know whether this regula-
tion happens immediately (as when the Utku Inuit recognize less
entitlement; Solomon, 1978), or whether it is a correction of an
initially different response (as when they consider the mitigat-
ing circumstances). At the level of relationships, regulation more
often takes the shape of re-appraisal, in particular when parents
provide children with a different perspective on the emotional sit-
uation. Finally, structural conditions of everyday life may afford
certain appraisals over others.
Individual tendencies
People’s beliefs about the world will guide their appraisals. For
example, whether the world is felt to be a predictable and con-
trollable place might lead to different evaluations of events than
when it is felt to be rather unpredictable and uncontrollable.
Moreover, the appraisal dimension of controllability tends to
be central in the appraisal patterns of anger and frustration
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Frijda et al., 1989; Stein et al., 1993; Kuppens
et al., 2003): Experiencing anger implies that something has
happened that is inconsistent with your goals, and that the sit-
uation is fixable and controllable. Therefore, one might expect
cultural differences in the frequency and intensity of anger and
frustration depending on the cultural schema of the world as con-
trollable or uncontrollable. This expectation was confirmed by
two studies in which European Americans’ emotional responses
were compared to those of Indians (Roseman et al., 1995) and
Tahitians (Levy, 1978). Whereas the European American cultural
ideals tend to emphasize control and predictability and, as such,
promote a view of the world as malleable (Weisz et al., 1984;
Mesquita and Ellsworth, 2001; Morling et al., 2002), Indian cul-
tural ideals don’t show this tendency (Miller et al., 1990; Savani
et al., 2011). Consistently, Roseman and colleagues found that
Indian college students rated self-reported emotional events to
be less “incongruent with their motives” and reported lower
overall intensities of anger than did their European American
counterparts. Moreover, anger intensity was fully mediated by a
person’s perception of the event as discrepant with his or her
goals. Similarly, the anthropologist Robert Levy pointed to the
Tahitians’ “common sense that individuals have very limited con-
trol over nature and over the behavior of others” (Levy, 1978,
p. 226), and related this fact to the observation of a near absence
of anger among the Tahitians. His explanation for this phe-
nomenon was that a universe that is defined as unpredictable and
uncontrollable might be “cognitively less frustrating than [. . .]
[a universe] in which almost anything is possible to individuals”
(p. 226).
Cultural contexts also differ substantially with regard to the
attribution of success or failure. European Americans have a per-
vasive tendency to attribute success to themselves, and failure
to others or the situation; the opposite is true for East Asians
(e.g., Heine et al., 1999). A recent study tested the idea that
cultural differences in the appraisal of causal agency are associ-
ated with different emotional experiences (Imada and Ellsworth,
2011). Japanese and European American college students were
asked to remember success and failure situations, to indicate
if these situations had been caused by themselves, others, or
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circumstances, and to rate the intensity of their feelings. As
expected, European Americans took more personal credit for
success than the Japanese; Japanese credited circumstances for
success. In contrast, the Japanese took more blame for failure
than the European Americans; European Americans blamed oth-
ers. These different appraisals were reflected in the emotions that
the participants experienced: European Americans reported to
feel pride when they succeeded, and anger or bad luck when they
failed; Japanese reported to feel lucky after when they succeeded
and shame when they failed. This pattern of success and failure
attributions is consistent with the observed self-enhancing ten-
dency that is characteristic of European American contexts and
the tendency to focus on self-improvement characteristic of inter-
dependent Japanese contexts. Moreover, the combined findings
support the idea that people’s habitual appraisals differ across cul-
tures in ways that make culturally valued emotional experiences
more likely.
There are also cultural differences in the perspective taken on
situations: European Americans tend to take a first person per-
spective, but East Asians more readily emphasize the meaning of
emotional situations for third others. These differences in per-
spective are likely to produce differences in emotional experience.
For example, a first-person perspective on a situation may high-
light how an event is inconsistent with one’s goals, how others
are responsible, and how others should accommodate to one’s
own wishes–all appraisals that render the experience of anger
and frustration more likely (Frijda, 1986). In a comparison of
European American and Japanese respondents, (Mesquita et al.,
unpublished) found that Japanese respondents reported indeed
more appraisals that reflected an awareness of the meaning of
the situation for other people. This study consisted of standard-
ized interviews in which participants reported on their emotional
experiences during a number of situations, e.g., situations of
offense. Respondents reported a situation from their past, and
their emotion narratives were recorded and later coded. The nar-
ratives suggested that, in the negative situations in particular,
Japanese considered the meaning of the events for other people.
This outside-in perspective on situationsmay be understood from
the need to be socially attuned. For example, more than 40% of
the Japanese, versus none of the European Americans, explained
an offense situation from the perspective of a third person or a
generalized other. In addition, in the offense situation, 56% of the
Japanese compared to only 5% of the European Americans tried
to understand or sympathize with the offender. Similarly, when
Japanese adolescents were victim of another person’s harmful
behavior, they tended to make positive attributions of the other
person’s intentions or to engage in self-criticism (“She did not
want to hurt me”; “Her behavior was accidental”; “I was wrong
to give her the impression of my provocation”). Kornadt (2011),
as reported in Trommsdorff (2012).
That cultural difference in perspective or appraisal lead to
different emotional experiences is also suggested by a study
in which people were asked to think about a past emotional
event (Grossmann and Kross, 2010, Study 2). In this study,
European American students reported more emotional distress
and blame, which might give rise to more anger, than their
Russian counterparts. These associations were partially mediated
by cultural differences in the students’ self-reflexive strategies
about the event. European Americans recounted the emotion-
ally arousing details of the past experience, thus immersing
themselves in a first person perspective. In contrast, the more
interdependently oriented Russians adopted a self-distancing per-
spective, thus imagining what the event could havemeant to other
people.
Whether people appraise situations to be about self-focused
concerns or about their relationship with others, has implications
for the types of emotions that they are likely to experience. In
two studies with Belgian college students, participants described
a recently experienced emotional situation and rated the intensity
of a wide range of emotions during this situation (De Leersnyder
and Mesquita, in preparation). They also indicated if and to
what extent the situation had been either consistent or incon-
sistent with a number of different concerns that were based on
the Schwartz value questionnaire (Schwartz, 1992). Some of these
concerns were other-focused (e.g., Benevolence, Universalism and
Conformity-Tradition), others were self-focused (Self-direction
and Achievement). Across both studies, the concerns or val-
ues that were appraised as relevant to the situation predicted
the type of emotions experienced. In situations that were rele-
vant to other-focused values, the odds of experiencing socially
engaging emotions were much higher than the odds of experi-
encing socially disengaging emotions. The opposite pattern of
associations held for situations that were relevant to self-focused
values. Moreover, the frequency with which these values were
perceived as relevant to students’ emotional situations exactly
mirrored young Belgians’ value hierarchy (i.e., most important
values as “guiding principles in people’s life”), as obtained from
a national representative sample by the European Social Survey
(ESS round 5; Norwegian social Science Data Services, 2012).
This finding suggests that emotional experiences are culturally
regulated to be about the most important cultural values: (1) cul-
turally salient values are more readily available as standards of
evaluation for emotional situations, and (2) the different types of
values—self-focused vs. other-focused—translate into different
patterns of emotional experience (more disengaging vs. engaging,
respectively).
Relational co-regulation
Other people’s appraisals are often referenced when people have
to assess the meaning of situations (Parkinson and Simons, 2009).
“Social referencing” is particularly evident in children, who often
look at their caregivers’ facial expressions when trying to appraise
a situation as, for example, dangerous or safe (e.g., Campos and
Stenberg, 1981); they can thus be said to construct the emotional
meaning of the situation in conjunction with their caregivers (see
Boiger and Mesquita, 2012). There is some evidence for cultural
differences in the ways caregivers help their children (re-)appraise
situations.
Different strategies for dealing with angry or frustrated chil-
dren have been observed for European (American) and Japanese
parents. One finding that stands out is that Japanese caregivers
reason with their angry children, emphasizing how others feel
when they hurt them (e.g., Conroy et al., 1980). Japanese parents
thus helped the children adopt the outside-in perspective that is
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also common for Japanese adults. Re-appraising angering situa-
tions in this way may explain the lower levels of anger in Japan
(Zahn-Waxler et al., 1996). Japanese parents rarely express direct
disagreement with their non-compliant children; instead, they go
through cycles of mutual perspective taking (Trommsdorff and
Kornadt, 2003) or express negativity indirectly, e.g., by “suffer-
ing” (DeVos, 1985) or through silence (Johnson, 1995). By not
providing direct verbal cues, parents give their children reason
to consider circumstantial features of the event and to adjust
their emotional response accordingly. In general, many of those
parental regulatory strategies may increase empathy and heighten
self-conscious emotions such as shame or guilt (Zahn-Waxler
et al., 1979). European American parents, on the other hand,
expect their children to self-assert and to stand up for them-
selves (Hess et al., 1980). When dealing with a non-compliant
child, they tend to use more coercion (Conroy et al., 1980;
Hess et al., 1980), e.g., removing the child from the situation.
Similarly, in an (independent) German context, parents’ behav-
iors encouraged appraisals of frustration in the child, leading to
high levels of anger, and possibly to an escalation of the parent-
child conflict (Trommsdorff and Kornadt, 2003). In independent
contexts, parents tended to emphasize a first-person perspective
on situations that may intensify the child’s felt emotions (Cohen
et al., 2007); a first person perspective also foregrounds socially
disengaging emotions, such as anger (see also Harwood et al.,
2002).
Co-regulation of appraisal also happens when parents pay
attention to their children’s emotions, and thus validate the
appraisal of the situation, or to the contrary, ignore the child’s
emotions and fail to endorse the child’s interpretation of the
event. For example, German mothers who witnessed their chil-
dren’s mishaps focused on the children’s distress, thereby con-
firming that the children had a good reason for their negative
emotions. By contrast, Japanese and Indianmothers ignored their
child’s negative emotions, thus challenging their interpretation of
the situation as one of distress (Trommsdorff and Friedlmeier,
1993, 2010; Trommsdorff, 2006).
Similarly, Cole and colleagues investigated how parents
respond to their children’s emotions in a series of studies
with children from two Nepali ethnic groups–the Tamang and
Brahman (Cole and Tamang, 1998; Cole et al., 2006). Although
these two ethnic Nepali groups share core cultural values of inter-
dependence, they emphasize different relational engagements.
The Tamang—Tibetan Buddhists—emphasize egalitarianism,
self-effacement and social harmony. The Tamang understand
anger as a forceful emotion that interferes with the social goals
of sharing and compassion, while shame is seen as a valuable
emotion that implies the awareness of one’s actions through the
eyes of others. The Brahmans, on the other hand, are mem-
bers of a high-status Hindu caste which is associated with ethnic
pride, social dominance, and a high level of self-control. In
Brahman eyes, anger constitutes a justifiable experience of a
proud high-caste member that, nevertheless, needs to be regu-
lated. Shame, on the other hand, is seen as a sign of personal
weakness. Caregivers’ responses to anger and shame episodes of 3-
and 5-year old children differed accordingly between the groups.
While Tamang caregivers reacted to expressions of anger by dis-
traction and reasoning, Brahman caregivers paid more positive
attention to anger episodes, supporting their children’s appraisal
that anger is justified. During shame episodes, Tamang care-
givers responded with reasoning and nurturing, while Brahman
caregivers largely ignored signs of shame, thus conveying that
experiencing and displaying shame is not desirable. In these stud-
ies, caregivers appeared to co-regulate their children’s emotion by
helping them (re)-appraise the situation in ways that reinforce
those emotions that are desirable according to their prevalent
cultural ideals.
To our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical evidence
that adults help each other in re-appraising situations in ways
that are consistent with their cultural values. However, there is
some anecdotal evidence for these co-regulatory processes beyond
childhood. For instance, Kitayama and Masuda (1995) describe
how US friends help each other when one is feeling shameful and
down: “good friends are supposed to [. . . ] encourage the person
by reorienting the person’s attention away from his own short-
comings to external objects or events the person can reasonably
blame for the impeding problem” (p. 220). These co-regulatory
efforts may explain why shame is frequently transformed into
anger in the American cultural context (Tangney et al., 1992,
as cited in Kitayama and Masuda, 1995). By re-appraising the
shameful event as caused by others rather than by oneself, the
focus shifts from one’s own painful shortcomings to the more
empowering experience of self-integrity, and others’ blamewor-
thiness. Maintaining high self-esteem and avoiding self-critical
information constitute central goals for the American indepen-
dent self anger can thus be seen as a more desirable end-point of
emotion regulation than shame.
Structural conditions
Finally, it is possible that an individual’s environment is struc-
tured in ways that emphasize certain meanings or appraisals over
others; a person’s appraisal of the situation would thus depend
on features of the situation that exert their influence independent
of (or in interaction with) individual tendencies and relational
co-regulation. Again, we would expect that these structural con-
ditions emphasize appraisals that contribute to emotional expe-
riences in line with the culturally defined end-points of emotion
regulation.
In an impressive demonstration of the effect, Savani and
colleagues (2011) have shown that participants apply another
culture’s interpretational schemes after having been exposed to
a large number of situations from that culture. In this experi-
ment, Savani and colleagues (2011, Study 5) exposed Indian and
European American students to interpersonal situations that were
sampled from both India and the US. As expected, Indian sit-
uations afforded more adjustment, whereas American situations
afforded more influence. While the Indian participants reported
initially more adjustment, and the US participants reported ini-
tially more influence, this pattern changed after the participants
had been exposed to a large number of situations from both
cultures; after 100 trials, the degree of adjustment reported by
European American and Indian participants converged. Thus,
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both situational affordances (i.e., Indian situations call for accom-
modation) and individual psychological tendencies (i.e., Indians
are by default more likely to adjust) contributed to cultural differ-
ences in how people reacted. While this study did not speak to the
emotions that people experience, it does make a strong case for
the idea that structural conditions afford certain appraisals, which
in turn should be associated with different emotional experiences.
A direct investigation of how structural conditions across cul-
tures afford certain appraisals over others, and thus regulate
emotional experiences, does not exist to our knowledge; how-
ever a few first promising results from a monocultural study
point in this direction. Kuppens et al. (2008) showed that peo-
ple’s appraisal of angering situations depends to a large extent on
the antecedent situations themselves. In two studies, situational
differences were a predictor (above and beyond individual dif-
ferences) of the types of appraisals used, accounting for about
20% of the variance in individual responses; in the words of the
authors, “different circumstances can pull for different charac-
teristic appraisals” (p. 10). Although their data were collected
among Belgian (Dutch-speaking) participants only, these results
clearly speak to the importance of situational characteristics for
individual emotional experience.
CONCLUSION
Emotional experience tends to be aligned with the culturally
valued ways of relating. This alignment can be attributed to
emotion regulation—i.e., all processes that help to attain the
culturally appropriate emotional experiences. In this article we
have reviewed the evidence for antecedent-focused emotion
regulation; that is regulation at the time of emotion elicitation.
We focused on two types of emotion regulation that fall under
this category: situation selection and appraisal. We discussed
research showing cultural differences in situation selection and
appraisal at the level of the individual, the relationship, and the
structure of everyday life. The combined evidence suggests that
much of the cultural regulation of emotions takes place at the
start of the emotion process, before there even is an emotional
experience. Response-focused emotion regulation, in the form of
suppression of emotional experience or expression, may be only
one of the many types of cultural regulation of emotions (e.g.,
Matsumoto et al., 2008). In fact, we submit that cultural regula-
tion is most likely to target the elicitation of emotions itself, since
suppression of already activated resources is much more effort-
ful. Response-focused regulation may be “culture’s last resort” for
shaping emotions in a culturally normative fashion–only to be
used when all other ways failed.
Our cultural perspective on emotion regulation highlights that
emotion regulation is not merely an intrapersonal process. Rather,
emotions are also regulated by others in our environment, and
by the ways in which our social worlds are structured in terms of
both and furthermore by adopting a cultural perspective we high-
lighted differences in the “endpoints” of emotion regulation, even
if emotion regulation universally aims to improve the individual’s
social adjustment. Finally, a cultural perspective underlines that
much of emotion regulation often happens outside the aware-
ness of the individual—through the situations that are culturally
promoted and the appraisals that are condoned and activated.
This means that most, if not all emotional experiences are (cul-
turally) regulated to some extent, even the ones that appear
“natural” to us.
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